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Summary:
This study provides a time series analysis of the dealer cost for
block transactions on the NYSE using daily data for the period 1972-1977.
The results indicate that the basic time series for block concessions for
plus and minus tick blocks are not random series. There is a discussion
of what variables affect the series and the implications for institutional
traders and government agencies.

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERTEMPORAL VARIATION
OF DEALER COSTS FOR BLOCK TRANSACTIONS
ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE*
David J. Wright
Frank K. Reilly**
INTRODUCTION
Recent innovations in the security market structure have increased
the demand for information concerning the economics of security trans-
action costs. The financial literature has focused on the behavior of
the security dealer, because the dealer's price quotations have a sig-
nificant impact on the cost of transacting. Since the dealer quotes
his bid and offer prices away from the perceived equilibrium price,
anxious investors incur a dealer cost (or liquidity cost) on their
transactions. Earlier studies analyzed the differences in the dealer
cost among a cross-section of transactions. In contrast to the pre-
vious studies, this investigation adds the dimension of time by exa-
mining the time series behavior of dealer costs. Specifically, this
study provides a time series analysis of the dealer cost for New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) block transactions. This involves the analysis
*The authors acknowledge the comments of Kenneth Carey, James Gentry
and Donald Roberts and the use of the computer facilities at the Uni-
versity of Illinois.
**The authors are Assistant Professor of Finance, Indiana University
and Professor of Finance, University of Illinois, respectively.
The major studies that used cross-sectional methodology are Harold
Demsetz, "The Cost of Transacting," Quarterly Journal of Economics 87
(February 1968): 33-53; Hans R. Stoll, "The Pricing of Security Dealer
Services: An Empirical Study of NASDAQ Stocks," Journal of Finance 33
(September 1978): 1153-72; and Seha M. Tinic, "The Economics of Liquid-
ity Services," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 86 (February 1972):
79-93.
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of the time series of daily price concessions on block trades during
the six year period 1972-1977.
Significance of the Study
An investigation of any systematic intertemporal variation in
dealer costs included in block transactions is important for several
reasons. The first is that this study adds the dimension of time to
the existing dealer behavior theory. The prior research on dealer
costs has relied primarily on cross-sectional methods which have been
beneficial in recognizing the wide spectrum of dealer transactions
costs prevailing at a point in time. On the other hand, these earlier
studies do not indicate whether the structure of dealer costs change
over time which is the purpose of this study.
In addition, this study contributes additional information on the
block securities market, which, because of its sheer size and relative
position in the capital market, is important. For the time period
1972 through 1977, an average of 145 blocks were traded per day repre-
senting a value of 93,630,000 dollars per day. In relative terms,
block trading accounted for 17.4 percent of the NYSE share volume
during the same time span. Furthermore, the persistence and growth
of the block market is apparent when, in 1977, there was an average
of 221 blocks per day and blocks represented 22.4 percent of the NYSE
share volume.
Further, the study results should be of assistance to investment
managers by integrating a dealer cost timing aspect into their insti-
tutional trading policy formation. The institutional investment
manager must consider transaction costs before making the decision to
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exchange assets within his portfolio. The hoped-for advantage of any
move must be weighed against the cost of making a decision to trade.
Only the trades which can increase performance by more than their
transaction cost can be justified. However, the investment manager
must first estimate the transaction cost which includes the investor's
own direct costs (e.g., communications), the explicit cost of commis-
sions and other fees, and the costs of any unfavorable price movements
induced by the dealer costs associated with his transaction. - The
unfavorable price movement induced by the dealer cost is the most
important of the three transaction cost determinants, because the
price movement is generally the largest portion of the total trans-
action cost and, the most unpredictable element. Therefore, prior to
the contemplated trade, it is necessary for the investment manager to
anticipate the unfavorable price movement linked to the transaction
dealer costs and recognize that this element may change over time.
Finally, this study should help in the development of a model of
the block trading mechanism which can be used for monitoring security
market transaction efficiency over time. The concept of security
market transaction efficiency refers to the market's capability to
provide a quick security exchange with transaction costs as low as
3possible, given the cost of providing the services. The concept can
2
U.S. Congress, House, Institutional Investor Study Report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
,
H. Doc. 92-64, 92nd Cong., 1st
sess., 1971, p. 1836.
3
Richard R. West, "On the Difference Between Internal and External
Market Efficiencv," Financial Analysts Journal 28 (November-December
1975): 30-34.
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be usefully applied to an examination of block trading. Some market
observers have claimed that the large price impact linked to a block
trade implies market transaction inefficiency. Their assessment is
correct only if the large impact did not reflect a genuine difference
in justifiable dealer costs for blocks. But, if the large price impact
simply reflects high dealer costs for blocks, then the size of the price
impacts do not, in themselves, imply transaction inefficiencies. Pre-
vious studies have examined the difference between the block trade price
impacts and price changes in the non-block market. Alternatively, this
study considers transaction efficiency within the block market and exa-
mines any difference in the treatment of blocks separated by time.
Outline of Study
The first section discusses dealer services including the factors
that influence the demand for these services and the cost of these ser-
vices. The second section contains a discussion of the prior studies
that examined the determinants of dealer spreads for normal transac-
tions and some early work concerned with block trade concessions. In
section three we consider the characteristics of the block transaction
market including a description of the block price reaction (BPR) indices
which reflect the dealer costs for block transactions. Section four
contains the basic time series analysis of the BPR indices and an ana-
lysis of other variables that influence the series systematic component.
In section five and six the analysis of time domain models and frequency
domain models are presented and discussed. Section seven contains a
summary, conclusion, and a discussion of the implication of the results
for those concerned with characteristics of the block trading market.
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DEALER SERVICES
Demand for Dealer Services
In conducting economic affairs within the security market arena,
there is often a considerable advantage in being able to quickly
exchange one asset for another. A market that facilitates a quick
security exchange is characterized by purchase orders and sell orders
which arrive in different share sizes at different times during any
given trading session. Since there may not be a matching purchase and
well order at the same moment, a continuous market requires mechanisms
for linking orders. The main cog in the mechanism is the dealer who
stands ready to trade for his own account and thereby provides market
participants the convenience of being able to exchange securities
immediately.
Investors would not need the dealer's services if there were per-
fect synchronization between buy and sell orders. If offsetting
orders were always in perfect balance, investors would instantly exe-
cute their transactions at the equilibrium price. Accordingly, the
transaction price would change only in response to changes in the
security's inherent value. In contrast, real markets are described
by temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders which create tem-
porary excess demand or excess supply at the equilibrium price.
Investors can still obtain a prompt execution of their orders by
trading with the dealer, but their orders may not be executed at the
equilibrium price. Dealers provide their services to anxious inves-
tors by bidding a price below the equilibrium and by asking a price
above the equilibrium. An investor's dealer cost on a particular
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transaction is equal to the absolute difference between the unobserv-
able equilibrium price and the actual transaction price. Consequently,
in real securities markets, the transaction price changes in response
to changes in the security's equilibrium value, plus it changes in
response to the dealer cost.
The dealer cost can be operationally measured by either the
spread, the percent spread, or the price change. By using these
measures, earlier studies found that the amount of the dealer cost
differs significantly among a given cross-section of transactions.
The following section contains a discussion of the prior studies that
have examined the factors which influence the size of the dealer cost
at a given point in time.
PRIOR STUDIES ON THE DETERMINANTS
OF DEALER COST
Recent studies have identified certain information factors which
determine the expected dealer costs among a cross-section of trans-
actions. These factors may be divided into three broad categories:
(1) security factors; (2) market factors; and (3) transaction order
factors.
Security Factors
One of the categories of information factors which affects the
dealer cost is the following set of characteristics directly related
to the security itself: the security's price, the security's expected
rate of trading volume, and the security's risk.
-7-
The Security's Price
All researchers who have investigated the dealer costs support a
positive relationship between the price of the security and the spread.
Security price is one of the original spread determinants that Demsetz
4
examined. Every subsequent study has supported a very significant
relationship which may be interpreted from two viewpoints. First, for
determining the dealer's inventory costs, the relevant measure of the
inventory is the dollar value of the holdings and not the number of
shares. The dealer will insist on a higher spread per share for
higher priced securities to offset the greater opportunity cost of the
additional funds he commits. Second, assuming everything equal except
price, traders will engage in arbitrage activities that will tend to
equalize spread per dollar traded. Thus, the higher price security
will experience a higher spread.
Although studies support a positive relationship between the price
of a security and the spread, the association does not appear to be
strictly linear. If the relationship were strictly linear, percent
spread would be invariant with respect to security price. In fact,
there are at least two reasons why percent spread will be negatively
related to security price. First, dealers incur certain minimum fixed
execution costs per 100 shares. For a given number of shares, the
higher price stocks allow these fixed costs to be distributed over a
greater dollar value traded. Eventually, as price increases, costs
per dollar value traded will decrease. Second, in a fractional pricing
4
Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting," p. 45.
system rather than a decimal pricing system, lower priced stocks might
incur an artificially high percent spread. For example, the minimum
allowable spread on the American Stock Exchange is one-eighth, unless
the price falls below one dollar. Empirical tests have supported the
non-proportionality of percent spread.
The Security's Expected Rate of Trading Volume
The dealer's expected cost associated with a transaction depends,
in part, on the security's expected rate of trading volume. The
dealer prefers an active security, because it provides a greater oppor-
tunity to buy and sell the security. With higher trading volume the
dealer incurs lower holding period costs on his security inventory.
A security's trading volume fluctuates daily in terms of its abso-
lute and relative volume. However, cross-sectional spread studies
have generally employed long-run measures of trading volume to match
their calculations of long-term spread computed as the arithmetic
average of actual spreads observed over the sample period. The two
basic characteristics that affect a security's long-run rate of trading
volume are its number of shareholders and its ownership characteristics.
Number of shareholders . In the long run, an important determinant
of a security's expected trading volume is its number of shareholders.
Both Demsetz and Hamilton found a significant, negative relationship
Ben Branch and Walter Freed, "Bid-Asked Spreads on the Amex and the
Big Board," Journal of Finance 32 (March 1977): 159-64.
Non-proportionality of percent spreads with respect to price has been
found on all major markets. See Branch and Freed, "Bid-Asked Spreads,"
p. 164; or George J. Benston and Robert L. Hagerman, "Determinants of
Bid-Asked Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market," Journal of Financial
Economics 1 (December 1974): 353-64.
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between spread and the natural logarithm of the number of shareholders.
Other studies measured long-run trading volume by averaging either share
o
volume or dollar volume of trading over the sample period. The results
of these studies indicated a significant, negative relationship with the
spread.
Ownership characteristics . There is a debate over the question of
how institutional ownership of a security will affect its spread. Some
market observers contend that an increase in the number of institutional
owners will induce a larger spread for all transactions of any size
because institutional transactions are usually much larger than indi-
vidual transactions, and large trading imbalances would force the
dealer to absorb huge amounts of inventory. Therefore, the dealer
would widen his spread for all investors to compensate for this poten-
tial increase in holding costs.
In contrast, one may argue that an increase in the number of insti-
tutional owners may actually reduce spreads. Because institutions
9
usually do not trade in parallel, portions of a large institutional
Demsetz, "The Cost of Transacting," p. 49; and James L. Hamilton,
"Competition, Scale Economies, and the Transaction Costs in the Stock.
Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 11 (December
1976): p. 788.
a
For a test of average daily volume see Seha Tinic, "The Economics of
Liquidity Services," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 86 (February
1972): 79-93.
9
Alan Kraus and Hans R. Stoll, "Parallel Trading by Institutional
Investors," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 7 (December
1972): 2107-38.
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trade can be matched through a network of institutional brokers, thus
reducing any imbalance the dealer may choose to absorb. For the por-
tion the dealer does absorb, he receives a larger price inducement so
the price on normal size transactions should not be adversely affected.
In fact, one may contend that the combination of numerous institu-
tional owners and the well-developed institutional broker network pro-
vides the dealer a quicker and more flexible avenue for security
inventory adjustment. This combination reduces the dealer's holding
costs so the individual investor would benefit on his trades in the
form of lower spreads.
Four investigations that examined the impact of institutional
ownership on security spreads reported a significant, negative rela-
tionship. Tinic found lower spreads on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) for securities that had a higher number of institutional
owners. Hamilton supported Tinic' s findings for an alternative
12(NYSE) sample for an Over-the-Counter (OTC) market sample. Barnea
Empirical support for a negative relationship between institutional
trading and stock volatility for the aggregate stock market is con-
tained in: Frank K. Reilly, "Institutions on Trial: Not Guilty,"
Journal of Portfolio Management
,
Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter, 1977), pp. 5-10;
Frank K. Reilly and John M. Wachowicz, Jr., "How Institutional Trading
Reduces Market Volatility," Journal of Portfolio Management
,
Vol. 5,
No. 2 (Winter, 1979), pp. 11-17; Frank K. Reilly, "Block Trades and
Stock Price Volatility," Financial Analysts Journal
,
forthcoming; and
Neil Barkman, "Institutional Investors and the Stock Market," New
England Economic Review
,
Federal Reserve Bank at Boston (November/
December, 1977), pp. 60-78.
Tinic, "The Economics of Liquidity Services," p. 90.
12
James L. Hamilton, Marketplace Organization and Marketability:
NASDAQ, the Stock Exchange, and the National Market System," Journal of
Finance 33 (May 1978): 496-97; and Hamilton, "Competition," p. 788.
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measured institutional ownership as the security's percentage holdings
by institutions and the results likewise indicated that institutional
13
ownership reduces a security's spread.
The Security's Risk
The theory and evidence concerning the affect that a security's
risks has on its spread makes three assumptions. First, each dealer
only provides quotations for one security. Second, because all
traders possess the same information at any point in time, their esti-
mated equilibrium prices are approximately the same. And, finally,
dealers are always risk adverse.
The dealer incurs a loss when the equilibrium value moves in a
detrimental direction depending on whether the dealer has a long
or short position. He loses on a long position when the equilibrium
price falls, and loses on a short position when the equilibrium price
rises. Because stocks with a more volatile equilibrium value will be
more costly to him, the dealer will widen spreads on volatile stocks
to compensate for the greater risk.
Two operational measures of price volatility that have been tested
are the price variance and the relative price range (the difference
between the high price and the low price divided by the average price)
,
13
Amir Barnea, "Performance Evaluation of New York Stock Exchange Spe-
cialists," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9 (September
1974), p. 530.
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Barnea and Stoll reported a significant, positive association between
14
price variance and spread. In contrast, Tinic did not find any
relationship between the price variance and the spread. Tinic 1 s
findings are questionable, since he used only nineteen consecutive
daily closing prices to compute the security's variance. Tests of the
association between the relative price range and the spread have also
produced mixed results. Tinic and West observed a significant, posi-
tive relationship for a Toronto Stock. Exchange sample, but found an
insignificant relationship for both a NYSE sample and an OTC Market
sample. Hamilton, who used the natural log of the relative price
range, found a significant, positive association with percent spread
on both the NYSE and the OTC Market.
The dealer's behavior toward security risk may be different if the
dealer is allowed to handle more than one security and the security's
risk is viewed within the context of his portfolio. Total security
risk within a portfolio context can be decomposed into systematic risk
and unsystematic risk. If the dealer holds a sufficient number of
14
Barnea, 'Performance Evaluation," p. 530; and Stoll, "Pricing Dealer
Services," p. 1165.
Tinic, "Economics of Liquidity Services," p. 90.
Sena M. Tinic and Richard R. West, "Marketability of Common Stocks
in Canada and the U.S.A.: A Comparison of Agent Versus Dealer Domi-
nated Markets," Journal of Finance 24 (June 1974): 729-46.
Hamilton, "Competition," p. 788; and Hamilton, "Marketplace Organi-
zation," pp. 496-97.
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securities, much of the unsystematic risk for individual stocks should
be eliminated. This would leave the systematic risk as a measure of
the risk level that is relevant to the dealer.
Benston and Hagerman argue that the level of systematic risk would
not affect spreads because the returns from holding the security com-
18
pensate the dealer for his opportunity cost of risk. They found an
insignificant relationship between spread and systematic risk for a
sample of OTC securities which supports their hypothesis.
On the other hand, Stoll claims that a security's systematic risk
is relevant to the dealer's cost because when the dealer facilitates
trading imbalances, he moves along the efficient frontier to a less
19desirable point. Thus, the returns from holding the security do not
fully compensate him for his lower utility. Stoll found a signifi-
cant, positive relationship between systematic risk and spread for an
OTC sample.
Insider trading also impacts the dealer's behavior toward risk.
Assuming the dealer has the same information as other investors, is
not realistic. The fact is, there is inside trading by investors who
have information concerning the equilibrium price that is superior to
the dealer's information. Because the dealer cannot identify insiders'
transactions he will always lose on these transactions. The dealer
must widen his spread on every transaction to compensate for the extra
costs of insider trading. If the level of insider trading differs
18
Benston and Hagerman, "Determinants," pp. 353-64.
19
Stoll, Pricing Dealer Services," pp. 1153-72.
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among securities, then a measure of insider trading should be posi-
tively related to the spread.
Since insider trading is not directly observable, three alter-
native measures have been proposed and tested. Benston and Hagerman
hypothesized that insider trading must be measured by unsystematic
20
risk. Since unsystematic risk measures the firm specific risk with
market movements accounted for, a stock with higher unsystematic risk
provides a greater opportunity to profit on inside information.
Benston and Hagerman felt the results supported their hypothesis,
because they found a significant, positive relationship between spread
and unsystematic risk. However, their findings may also be interpreted
as an indication of insufficient portfolio diversification. Stoll
assumes that a measure of a security's insider trading is its turnover
(dollar value traded divided by dollar value of shares outstanding
because for a given amount of shares outstanding, higher trading means
21
that there is more informational trading. Stoll' s measure was
significant and positive in relation to the spread. Yet, one may con-
tend that trading turnover is a function of a number of other factors
such as investors' varying liquidity needs and institutional portfolio
rebalancing. Therefore, trading turnover is a poor proxy for the
level of insider trading. Finally, Barnea and Logue measured insider
trading by the risk rating of Financial World because a higher risk
22
security offers a better opportunity for profitable insider trading."
20
Benston and Hagerman, 'Determinants," pp. 353-64.
21
Stoll, "Pricing Dealer Services," p. 1163.
?2
Amir Barnea and Dennis E. Logue, "The Effect of Risk on the Market
Maker's Spread," Financial Analysts Journal 31 (November-December
1975): 45-49.
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The ratings were significantly related to spreads. All three opera-
tional measures of a security's insider trading level were found to
be positively related to the spread.
Market Factors
Dealer cost is also affected by the characteristics of the mar-
ket in which the transaction occurs. A market factor is defined as
a structural aspect of the dealer organization which influences the
dealer's operating expense or the nature of competition among the
dealers .
Designated Marketplace Structure
The designated marketplace is a specific association of members
who assemble bids and offers. Examples of designated marketplaces are
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (ASE),
the Over-The-Counter market (OTC), and the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE). The way the dealers are organized differs among the alterna-
tive marketplaces. On the NYSE and the ASE, there is typically only
one dealer assigned to each security and their activity is monitored
by the exchange. In contrast, OTC dealers are free to act indepen-
dently. The structure of the TSE favors an agency type market which
discourages exchange members from providing dealer services outside of
odd-lot trading. These structural differences may affect the dealer
cost of a transaction while holding other factors constant.
Two studies examined the influence of the marketplace on dealer
costs. Tinic and West discovered significant differences among three
-16-
23
alternative marketplaces. The rank of dealer cost for lowest to
highest was the NYSE, OTC, and TSE. Hamilton also found the NYSE
offered cheaper dealer services relative to the OTC; however, he ques-
24
tioned Tinic and West's sampling procedure. Tinic and West's market-
place samples were unmatched in time, because they compared a March
1969 OTC sample to a November 1971 NYSE sample. If dealer costs vary
over time, the difference of thirty-one months between their samples
could affect their findings. Hamilton matched his samples in time,
controlled for more dealer cost influences and found the NYSE spread
was 4 percent lower than the OTC spread.
Designated Security Structure
The designated security structure is the degree of dealer concen-
tration for a particular security— i.e., the number and size distribu-
tion of the dealers from all of the marketplaces. Dealer concentration
affects the intensity and the effectiveness of dealer competition
—
e.g., numerous competing dealers who are relatively equal in size
reduce the spread.
As noted previously, for a cross-section of securities, there is
a negative relationship between the rate of trading volume and the
spread. It is important to determine whether this relationship is
true for the individual dealer firm or for the industry of dealer firms
who provide quotations on a specific security. On the one hand, com-
petition would be ineffective if the individual dealer firm faces a
23
Tinic and West, "Marketability: A Comparison," p. 741.
24
Hamilton, "Marketplace Organization," p. 489.
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decreasing marginal cost curve, because the optimal size for the indi-
vidual dealer firm would grow so large in relation to the market that
there would be only room for one dealer firm. Alternatively, com-
petition is effective if the economies of scale only apply to the
industry and not to the individual firm. In the latter case, the
industry's marginal cost curve would decrease as output increases;
yet, the firm's marginal cost curve would be "U shaped" over the rele-
25
vant volume levels. Under these conditions, economies of scale are
internal to the industry, but external to the firm. Higher output
levels for the industry would benefit the firm by shifting the firm's
cost curve down. The empirical tests of these two opposing views
indicate that economies of scale apply only to the industry which
means that competition is an effective force. Specifically, higher
volume levels were positively related to the number of dealers in
contrast to the natural monopoly case that would predict no asso-
ciation between the two variables.
A number of studies found that dealer concentration in a security
affects its spread. All of the investigations of OTC competition sup-
port a significant, negative relationship between the number of dealers
27for a security and its spread. In addition, Stoll predicted that
25
Stoll, Pricing Dealer Services," pp. 1153-72.
26
Seha M. Tinic and Richard B. West, "Competition and the Pricing of
Dealer Service in the Over-The-Counter Stock Market," Journal of Finan-
cial and Quantitative Analysis 7 (June 1972): 1707-27; Stoll, "Pricing
Dealer Services," p. 1165.
27
Tinic and West, "Competition," pp. 1707-27; Benston and Hagerman,
"Determinants," pp. 360-61; Hamilton, "Marketplace Organization," pp.
496-97; and Stoll, "Pricing Dealer Services," p. 1165.
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the relative size of the dealers influences the level of competition.
He found a positive association between spread and the amount of volume
centralized among dealers. Together, the studies show that both the
number and size distribution of dealers affects spreads.
Although there is typically only one dealer (i.e., specialist)
named per stock on the NYSE, it is possible to show that dealer con-
centration affects the spread. In this case competition comes from
outside markets where the security is traded (i.e., regional stock
exchanges and the OTC market). External competition is measured by
counting the number of competing markets where the stock is traded.
Using this approach, Demsetz found no relationship to spreads, while
studies by Hamilton and Branch and Freed supported the hypothesized
29
negative relationship between external competition and spread.
Tinic considered both the number of outside markets and their volume
characteristics by computing the Herfindal Index of Concentration
which considers both the number of markets and the distribution of
trading activity among markets. Using this Index, Tinic found a nega-
30
tive relationship between NYSE spreads and external competition.
Transaction Order Factors
Transaction order factors are characteristics directly related
to the nature of the trade including size of the trade and the active
28
Stoll, "Pricing Dealer Services," p. 1164.
29
Demsetz, Cost of Transacting," p. 49; Hamilton, "Marketplace Organi-
zation," pp. 496-97; and Branch and Freed, "Bid-Asked Spreads," p. 161.
30
Tinic, The Economics of Liquidity Services," p. 90.
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side of the trade (whether the trade is initiated by an anxious seller
or by an anxious buyer).
Share Size of the Transaction Order
The share size of a transaction should be positively related to
the dealer cost because of the greater expenses involved in relatively
larger transactions. Large-scale share orders increase the probability
that the order will not be matched as quickly because the dealer may
have difficulty locating the other size of the trade. Thus he incurs
higher inventory holding costs and greater search costs for locating
matching orders. Therefore the dealer quotes his bid and offers prices
further away from the equilibrium price for large transactions.
Those who believe that transaction share size affects dealer costs
would expect a relatively large dealer cost on block trades. Hence,
several studies analyzed the intra-day price behavior linked to the
block transaction. Two common measures of block price behavior are
the price impact and the price reversal. The price impact is typi-
cally defined as the percentage price change computed from the price
on a trade made before the block transaction, to the price on the
block transaction. The price reversal is defined as the percentage
price change computed from the price on either the block transaction
or on a trade executed during the immediate post block period, to the
day's closing price.
The behavior of the price impacts and the price reversals can be
used to test whether dealer costs are affected by block trades. On
the one hand, a large dealer cost on blocks would cause a major price
impact, since price changes are a function of both the dealer cost and
-20-
the change in the equilibrium price. The relatively larger dealer
cost is primarily related to the block transaction, so its effects are
only temporary. Therefore, if block trades have greater dealer costs,
the price reversal should be substantial in size and in the opposite
direction of the price impact . On the other hand, a negligible dealer
cost on blocks would imply that the price impact is essentially caused
by an equilibrium value change. Consequently, if block trades have no
affect on dealer costs, the price reversal would be relatively insig-
nificant .
Kraus and Stoll conducted the first major analysis of the price
31impacts and price reversals on block trades. They examined 7,009
NYSE block transactions divided into positive tick blocks, zero tick
32blocks, and negative tick blocks. The tick classifications identify
the active and passive sides of a trade. The tick tends to be posi-
tive when there is an anxious buyer and generally negative when there
33
is an anxious block seller. Kraus and Stoll found that the average
price impact, calculated from the price immediately prior to the block
transaction, was -1.14 percent for minus tick blocks followed by a
significant average price reversal for the minus tick blocks equal to
.71 percent. This evidence supports the hypothesis that dealer costs
are affected by the size of transactions, because of the size and
direction of the price reversal. The rapid price recovery on minus
31
Alan Kraus and Hans R. Stoll, "Price Impacts of Block Trading on
the New York Stock Exchange," Journal of Finance 27 (June 1972): 88.
32
The sign of the tick refers to the relationship of the price on the
block transaction relative to the price on the trade prior to the block
transaction.
33
Kraus and Stoll, "Price Impacts," p. 573.
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tick blocks is consistent with the temporarily large dealer cost
necessary to exchange a large number of shares quickly.
A study by Trippi and Nora examined NYSE blocks during an alterna-
tive time span (March 1973 through August 1973) and derived results
34
similar to Kraus and Stoll. Another study by Close found signifi-
cant dealer cost price effects for trades of $100,000 or more on the
35
Montreal and Toronto Stock Exchanges.
Grier and Albin examined the price reversal on blocks from the
36
viewpoint of market efficiency. They calculated the price impacts
from the opening price for a sample of blocks. A filter rule ranked
the price impacts in deciles from the lowest to the highest. Price
reversals computed using the block transaction price indicated an
average price reversal of 2.12 percent for blocks with the lowest
price impact. The size of the price reversal clearly indicated that
block dealer costs are substantially higher than on normal size
trades. However, caution must be used if one interprets the results
37
as evidence contrary to the efficient market hypothesis.
34
Robert R. Trippi and Yuris Nora, "An Analysis of Price Impacts of
Large Block Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange," Journal of
Economics and Business 28 (Winter 1976): 88-95.
35
Nicholas Close, Price Reaction to Large Transactions in the Cana-
dian Equity Markets," Financial Analysts Journal 31 (November-December
1975): 50-57.
Paul C. Grier and Peter S. Albin, "Nonrandora Price Changes in Asso-
ciation with Trading Large Blocks," Journal of Business 46 (July 1973):
425-33.
37
All costs of operating trading rules must be considered before inter-
preting the price reversal results as evidence of market inefficiency.
See Robert Reback, "Nonrandora Price Changes in Association with Trading
in Large Blocks: A Comment," Journal of Business 47 (October 1974):
564-65.
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A study by Carey created deciles of block price impacts similar to
Grier and Albin and calculated three price reversals for each decile,
based upon the prices on the following trades: the block transaction,
the first trade occurring one minute after the block transaction, and
38
the first trade occurring fifteen minutes after the block transaction.
The computed price reversals in the decile with the lowest price
impacts were the following: 2.95 percent for a purchase on the block
transaction; 1.90 percent assuming a trade made one minute later; and
.59 percent assuming the trade occurred after fifteen minutes had
elapsed. This implies that dealers for anxious block sellers receive
a 2.95 percent gross return. Notably, the abnormally large block
dealer cost is very temporary since the observable price impacts
change considerably in just one minute after the block transaction.
A study by Dann, Mayers, and Raab calculated the following five
types of price reversals: purchase at the block, plus trades at one,
39
five, ten, and fifteen minutes after the block. Their results
suggest that "trading rule profits, net of commissions and transfer
40
taxes, ...evaporate within one minute after the block." The analysis
implies that excess dealer costs occur primarily on the block trans-
action and that the abnormal dealer cost declines significantly on
trades made during the immediate post block period. In fact, prices
on trades made just fifteen minutes after the block transaction are
38
Kenneth J. Carey, "Nonrandom Price Changes in Association with
Trading in Large Blocks: Evidence of Market Efficiency in Behavior
of Investor Returns," Journal of Business 50 (October 1977): 407-414.
39
Larry Y. Dann, David Mayers, and Robert I. Raab, "Trading Rules,
Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment," Journal of Financial
Economics 4 (January 1977): 3-22.
40
Ibid., p. 18.
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unbiased estimators of the closing prices which means the abnormal
dealer cost evaporates entirely within fifteen minutes.
An implication of the relationship between transaction share size
and dealer costs is that the absolute size of the price impact should
be positively correlated with the size of the block because the dealer
requires additional compensation with the larger transactions. The
results of the two studies confirm this relationship. Kraus and
Stoll found a statistically significant positive relationship between
the absolute value of the price impact and the dollar value of both
41
plus and minus tick blocks. A study by Radcliffe likewise revealed
a statistically significant positive relationship between the absolute
4?
value of the price impact and the share size of the blocks.
In contrast, Scholes argued that the size of transactions has no
43
effect on dealer costs. Scholes analyzed the abnormal dealer cost
44
associated with secondary distributions rather than block trades.
When Scholes examined price reversals in a manner similar to the Kraus
and Stoll study the results were as follows: a) the price reversal
was insignificant in size, and b) the correlation between the size of
41
Kraus and Stoll, Price Impacts," p. 582.
42
Robert C. Radcliffe, 'Liquidity Costs and Block Trading, Financial
Analysts Journal 29 (July-August 1973): 73-80.
43
Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices," Journal
of Business 45 (April 1972): 179-211.
44
A secondary distribution is a method of selling a large number of
securities. A syndicate of brokers is generally found and the sale
is made after the market is closed.
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the secondary distribution and the absolute price impact was statisti-
cally insignificant. Therefore, Scholes argues that large transac-
tions do not influence dealer costs. Kraus and Stoll disagreed with
Scholes' interpretation of the statistical results because they con-
tended that secondary distributions differed from block trades for the
following reasons: a) the seller pays commission fees on both the buy
and sell side and b) secondary distributions generally take more than
45
a day to complete. Since the seller pays a double commission the
additional costs of handling a large transaction are taken care of by
an abnormal commission fee rather than an abnormal dealer cost.
Active Side of the Trade
The dealer cost may be influenced by whether a transaction is
initiated by an anxious seller or by an anxious buyer. The Demsetz
assumption that the equilibrium price is equal to the mid-point of the
bid-ask spread implies that dealer costs on normal size trades are
46
equal for anxious sellers and buyers. However, the results of the
Kraus and Stoll study suggest that dealer costs are not symmetric for
47block trades. They divided their sample of block trades according
to the signs of the blocks' ticks and found that the price impacts and
price reversals were significantly different for minus versus plus
tick blocks. The average price impact on plus tick blocks (.71
percent) was smaller than on minus tick blocks (1.14 percent). Of
45
Kraus and Stoll, 'Price Impacts," pp. 586-87.
46
Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting," p. 37.
47
Kraus and Stoll, "Price Impacts," pp. 573-74.
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more importance, the average price reversal on plus tick blocks was
only .09 percent compared to .71 percent on minus tick blocks. Kraus
and Stoll explained this difference as a function of the block
dealers' alternative operating methods. While block dealers acquire
security positions to facilitate the needs of anxious block sellers,
block dealers rarely take a short position to facilitate a block
purchase. Therefore, the dealers' inventory costs are primarily asso-
ciated with minus tick blocks. However, one should be cautious with
Kraus and Stoll' s interpretation since they did not control for any
differences in the average share size between plus and minus tick
blocks.
Summary
An imperfect transaction market is characterized by temporary
excess demand and supply at the equilibrium price. The security
dealer provides anxious investors the assurance of an immediate off-
setting order by maintaining continuous price quotations for a quick
sale or purchase of securities. Since the dealer quotes his bid and
offer away from the perceived equilibrium price, anxious investors
incur a dealer cost on their transactions. Therefore, price vola-
tility in an imperfect transaction market is caused by both changes
in the equilibrium price and the dealer cost.
There are three proxies of the dealer cost: the bid-ask spread,
the percent bid-ask spread, and the transaction-to-transaction price
change. Prior studies have identified three major categories of
information factors which can explain cross-sectional dealer cost dif-
ferences: security factors, market factors, and transaction factors.
-26-
The analyses of the security factors has indicated that the bid-
ask spread is positively correlated with the price per share although
the relationship is not strictly linear. Further, the expected rate
of trading volume is negatively related to the bid-ask spread because
the level of volume basically determines the length of the holding
period. In turn, trading volume is a function of both the number of
shareholders and the amount of institutional ownership. Finally, it
was shown that dealers widen their spreads on riskier stocks although
there is a controversy on the relevant risk measure (i.e., the secur-
ity's systematic risk, unsystematic risk, or total risk).
Dealer costs are also determined by the characteristics of the
market in which the transaction occurs. The study results indicate
that alternative security exchanges have significantly different bid-
ask spreads and bid-ask spreads are inversely associated with dealer
competition.
An analysis of the impacts of the transaction order indicated that
the size of a transaction is positively related to the dealer cost
although the abnormally large dealer costs quickly evaporate after the
block trade. Also the evidence indicates that anxious block sellers
pay a higher dealer cost than anxious block buyers.
SECURITY DEALER COSTS IN THE BLOCK TRANSACTION MARKET
One of the acknowledged features of a transaction that affects
dealer costs is the number of shares traded. For a large trade, it is
less likely that a matching order of the same size will exist simul-
taneously. Thus it will require greater dealer participation in the
trade. Therefore, data on large security transactions is especially
-27-
useful for a time series analysis of dealer behavior. This section
focuses on growth of the block market, the block dealer market, and
the block price reaction (BPR) indices that are used in the analysis.
Institutional Activity and Block Trades
As shown in Table 1 block trading activity has grown dramatically
since 1965. This growth in block trading activity is the results of
two factors. First, total trading activity by large institutional
investors has increased over time. Second, there has also been a
substantial increase in the proportion of total institutional trading
done in blocks.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that the dollar value of common
stock purchases and sales by major financial institutions has tripled
since 1965. In addition, the proportion of institutional purchases
and sales to the total dollar volume on all exchanges has increased
from .259 in 1965, to .377 in 1977. Currently, there is an average of
almost 300 block trades a day and about one of every five shares bought
and sold on the NYSE is through a block transaction. While the table
stops in 1977 it is known that the block market experienced further
growth in 1978 and 1979 and there are no signs of a decline.
Supply of Block Dealer Services
Because the regular auction market could not adequately handle the
increasing number of abnormally large transactions several of the
large brokerage firms introduced a dealer service specifically
48designed to facilitate block transactions. As a result, the large
brokerage firms are now the primary source of block dealer services.
48
For a further discussion on this topic see Frank K. Reilly, Invest -
ment Analysis and Portfolio Management (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden
Press, 1979), Chapter 4.
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A block dealer may be defined as any person or firm who is con-
tinuously in contact with market participants and who is willing to
49provide bid and offer price quotations on block size transactions.
The block dealers differ from other dealers in the following ways:
block dealers are large brokerage firms; block trades are negotiated
over the dealers 1 communication network rather than auctioned on the
exchange floor; block market participants are financial institutions
rather than individual investors.
Number of Blocks According to the Tick Sign
NYSE blocks may be divided into three categories on the basis of
whether their tick sign was positive, zero, or negative. The tick
sign can identify the anxious party of a block trade, i.e., whether
the block was executed by an anxious block purchaser (a positive tick)
or an anxious seller (a negative tick). Table 2 contains the percent
of blocks according to tick. The table supports the notion that
blocks are sold not bought— i.e. , there is a propensity to sell a
position through a block transaction, but positions are typically
accumulated through smaller purchases over a period of time. Speci-
fically, 40.1 percent of the blocks had negative ticks while only 18.7
percent of the blocks had positive ticks. The high proportion of zero
49
A recent survey of institutions ranked the brokerage firms who were
the "best for block handling." The top four firms out of the list of
twenty were Goldman Sachs and Co.; Salomon Brothers; Morgan Stanley
and Co. Inc.; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc.
Peter Z. Grossman, "Who are Wall Street's Best Brokers?" Financial
World, 1 December 1978, p. 21.
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TABLE 2
DAILY OBSERVATIONS OF NYSE BLOCK TRADES-
NUMBER OF POSITIVE TICK, ZERO TICK AND NEGATIVE TICK
BLOCKS AS A PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BLOCKS
1972-1977
Year Positive Tick Blocks Zero T ick Blocks Negative Tick Blocks
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1972
a
14.5 9.6 56.2 25.8 29.3 18.0
1973 14.7 4.8 40.0 5.9 45.4 7.8
1974 13.6 5.2 38.7 6.5 47.7 7.7
1975 19.8 5.4 39.1 5.9 41.1 7.8
1976 23.1 5.4 43.2 6.1 33.6 7.2
1977 22.1 5.1 44.5 7.8 33.5 7.7
Total
Period 18.7 6.3 41.2 6.7 40.1 9.3
-31-
tick blocks, 41.2 percent, is reflective of the specialist's limit
orders that must be executed prior to the block transaction.
The Block Price Reaction Indices
As noted, this study analyzes the time series properties associated
with the intertemporal variation of dealer costs by examining the trans-
action-to-transaction price behavior of large security transactions.
More specifically, the study will examine the block price reaction
indices (BPR) which have the following characteristics:
A) Transactions of 10,000 shares or more . The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) defines a block trade as a transaction of 10,000
shares or more. Block trades make up a subset of all transactions
such that the elements of this subset possess a mutual minimum
transaction share size criteria.
B) New York Stock Exchange Transactions . Transactions executed in
alternative marketplaces may cause differences in dealer costs.
Since this analysis centers on transactions executed on the NYSE,
the effects of marketplace differences is eliminated.
C) Transactions-to-transaction percentage price changes . A per-
centage price change is computed for each individual NYSE block
transaction. The percentage price change is computed from the price
of the transaction immediately prior to the block trade _to the price
on the block trade itself. The transaction-to-transaction price
change is the most direct indication of the dealer cost linked to
Seha " Seha M. Tinic and Richard B. West, "Marketability of Common
Stocks in Canada and the U.S.A.: A Comparison of Agent Versus Dealer
Dominated Markets," Journal of Finance 24 (June 1974): 726-746.
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a particular block transaction. The individual NYSE block price
changes are subdivided into three categories according to whether
the price changes are positive, zero, or negative.
D) Daily Arithmetic average . The basic unit of time in this study
is the daily trading session. For each day, two arithmetic averages
are computed from the individual NYSE block price changes. One
average is computed for all positive price changes and another
average is computed for all negative price changes. If expected
dealer costs change systematically over time, temporal dealer cost
factors can affect the whole set of block trades, but the magnitude
of impact need not be the same for all blocks. Consequently, these
price changes must be averaged over many block trades in order
to sort out the systematic influences from factors that are unique
to particular blocks.
The daily average (either negative or positive) of transaction-to-
transaction percentage price changes associated with NYSE blocks will
be referred to as the block price reaction . More formally, the two
block price reaction indices are defined as:
BPR (t) =
V(t)
x
B.(t) - P.(t)
and
n V(t) P.(t)
i=l
W(t)
±
B (t) - P.(t)
BPR (t) =
(t) P (t)
j=l
-33-
where,
BPR (t) = Block Price Reaction for negative tick, blocks on trade day t.
n
BPR (t) = Block Price Reaction for positive tick blocks on trade day t.
P
P.(t) = Price per share of the last transaction before the ith negative
tick block.
P.(t) = Price per share of the last transaction before the jth positive
tick block.
B.(t) = Price per share of the ith negative tick block transaction on
1
trade day t.
3.(t) = Price per share of the jth positive tick block transaction on
trade day t.
V(t) = Total number of negative tick blocks on trade day t. A negative
tick block is a block transaction where the block price per
share is less than the price per share on the preceding trans-
action. (B.(t) < P.(t)).
1 l
W(t) = Total number of positive tick blocks on trade day t. A positive
tick block is a block transaction where the block price per
share is greater than the price per share on the preceding
transaction. (B.(t) > P.(t)).
t = The particular trade day within the six year period of daily obser-
vations, t=l, 2, . . ., 1514.
The block price reactions for both negative and positive tick
blocks are computed for each trading day. The time series consist of
all days the NYSE was open over the time span of 1972 through 1977
(i.e., 1,514 daily observations). Plots of the block price reactions
-34-
for both negative and positive tick blocks are illustrated in Figures
One and Two respectively.
The Hypotheses
The analysis of the block price reaction time series tests the
hypothesis whether expected dealer costs on block trades change over
time. The null hypothesis states that each BPR index time series is
a sequence of constant mean, uncorrelated random variables, i.e., the
expected dealer cost on blocks is invariant over time. The alternative
hypothesis states that successive observations of the BPR index are
correlated and that the analysis of dealer costs must take into account
the time order of the observations.
The alternative hypothesis argues that the behavior of each BPR
index is the result of a mixture of causes. On the one hand, equili-
brium price changes produce an irregular, random effect in the series.
On the other hand, systematic intertemporal dealer cost variation
brings about a degree of regularity in the series. The mixture of
these causes, operating in parallel over time, create an orderly, non-
random component in the block price reaction series. Therefore, the
behavior of each BPR index bears a systematic element which can be
isolated, identified, and described by an appropriate time series model .
If the statistical evidence refutes the null hypothesis, it is
necessary to determine which temporal information factors can explain
the behavior of the BPR indices. Based upon a consideration of the
dealer cost literature, the causal relationship between block dealer
costs and certain market variables is tested.
-35-
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TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE BLOCK
PRICE REACTION INDICES
The primary goal of this section is to gain insights into block,
dealer cost behavior by constructing time series models of the BPR
indices. Suitable models for the BPR indices may be found by following
two basic steps. First, statistical tests determine whether the obser-
vations could have occurred in any order. Second, if the tests indi-
cate that a simple white noise model does not sufficiently describe the
BPR indices, then performance of additional tests can suggest more
complicated models in both the time and frequency domain.
Descriptive Statistics of the BPR Indices
Plots of the BPR Indices are contained in Figures 1 and 2. Table 3
contains descriptive statistics for the daily observations of the BPR
Indices. The plots and the table help determine whether the indices'
variation may be explained by trend movements. Trend is the broad
long-term movement in a time series whereby the mean of the process
changes in a smooth manner extending over a considerable time period.
In this study, any deterministic monthly movement may be regarded as
trend.
The results in Table 3 suggest that both indices behave in a
similar manner, because they both exhibit their highest levels in
1974. In contrast, they are dissimilar in that the BPR index is
n
usually greater than the BPR index and the apparent trend movement in
the BPR index is more accentuated than the BPR index,
n p
The difficulty with this definition is what is meant by "long term.'
The idea of long term is a relative one, therefore, a practical defi-
nition of trend should take into account the unit of time and the
number of available observations.
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Tests of Weak White Noise Behavior
In this subsection we present the results of tests to determine
whether the observations of either the BPR or the BPR time series
n p
were generated by a weak white noise process. A weak white noise pro-
cess is defined as a sequence of uncorrelated, constant mean random
variables. Both a runs test and an examination of the correlogram are
applied to the BPR indices.
Runs Test . After each observation was assigned a plus or minus
sign, the number of runs was tabulated and compared to the expected
52
number under the assumption that the sample is random. If the sample
is random, the number of runs (R) is asymptotically normal with
E(R) -
-| (2T - 1)
and
where
V(R) = -± (16T - 19)
R = number of runs;
E(R) = expected number of runs if the sample is random;
V(R) = variance of the number of runs;
T = total sample size.
Table 3 and the BPR time plots suggest a shifting population mean
over time. Therefore, a left-tail test is appropriate, because the
52
When successive observations were tied with each other, the zero
change was disregarded so that the number of runs and sample size were
reduced. See Ya-lun Chou, Statistical Analysis with Business and Eco-
nomic Applications (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, pp.
440-42.
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presence of trend may create a situation where there are too few runs.
The null hypothesis may be stated as "the sample is a random sample."
That is, H : R = E(R).
The alternative hypothesis may be stated as "the sample is non-random
with a shifting population mean." That is, H : R < E(R).
The results for the BPR index are the following. Under the null
n
hypothesis,
E(R) = (y) ((2) (1,481-1)) = 987
and
V(R) = (-j) ((16) (1,481-29)) = 262.97;
therefore, reject H at the five percent significance level if:
R < 987 - 1.645 V262. 97 = 960.32.
Since R = 959 for the BPR index, the null hypothesis is rejected .
For the BPR index, the null hypothesis implies that
E(R) = (i) ((2) (1,475-1)) = 983
and
V(R) = (975) ((16) (1,475-29)) = 261.9;
therefore, reject H
n
at the five percent significance level if:
R < 983 - 1.645 V261.9 = 956.3.
Since R = 984 for 3PR index, the null hypothesis is accepted.
P
-40-
The runs test suggests that the BPR index is not random, but the
SPR is random. However, caution must be used in the interpretation
P
—
of the runs test results for BPR . It is conceivable that a process
P
is not white noise, yet it might still be accepted as "random" by the
runs test. For example, BPR observations may be characterized by a
systematic swing above and below a changing trend. Thus, the system-
atic swing would increase the number of runs causing the randomness
assumption to be accepted.
Correlogram . An examination of time series' autocorrelation
coefficients may indicate the presence of trend. If a time series
contains trend, then the autocorrelation coefficients will not come
down to zero, except for very large lags . That is, an observation on
one side of the overall mean tends to be followed by a large number of
subsequent observations on the same side of the overall mean due to
the changes in trend.
A linear trend was removed from each BPR index before calculating
their autocorrelations. Specifically, the least squares method was
used to estimate the coefficients in the following linear trend model:
BPR(t) = b + b. (t - t) + e(t)
o 1
where,
BPR(t) = observation of the block price reaction at time t;
e(t) = residuals of the linear trend regression at time t;
b = mean of the time series:
o
b = slope of the time series;
Z t
1
T
T = total number of observations.
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Using this model, BPR had a mean and slope equal to .796 and .0000002,
respectively. BPR had a mean and slope equal to 1.105 and -.0002528,
respectively. Autocorrelation coefficients were calculated for the
residuals to determine whether a higher order trend was still present
in each series.
A useful aid in interpreting a set of autocorrelation coefficients
is a graph called a correlogram in which the coefficients are plotted
against the lag. Correlograms of the BPR and BPR trend residuals are
given in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. The autocorrelation coeffi-
cients are shown for lag zero through lag 400. Notably, both correlo-
grams clearly indicate the presence of a non-linear trend, because the
autocorrelation coefficients do not come down to zero until the lag at
approximately 300.
In sum, both the runs test and the correlogram suggest that BPR
is not weak white noise
,
because the series clearly exhibits a strong
non-linear trend. In contrast, there are conflicting results for the
BPR index since the runs test suggests that the BPR index is random,
P P
but the correlogram indicates a relatively weak trend.
Identification of Trends in the BPR Indices
The previous section indicates that both indices are more compli-
cated than simple weak white noise. When describing the non-random
behavior of the BPR indices, it is convenient to represent each index
53
as the sum of a trend component and a residual (irregular) component.
More specifically,
53
No obvious cycles or seasonal movement is apparent in the BPR time
plots, therefore, a cyclical component has been left out of the model.

-42-
1.00
.75
.50
.25 .
WW
^>*VrW
'Wv«^
'N^^
^^^^s
.25
100 200
TIME LAG
300 400
Fig 3 Correlogram for the positive tick block price
reaction index BPR
p
1.00
100 200
TIME LAG
300 400
Fie. 4Corr9 '°9 ram for tne negative tick block price reaction index BP0
-43-
BPR(t) = m(t) + e(t)
where,
BPR(t) = block price reaction index at time t;
m(t) = trend component at time t;
e(t) = residual (irregular) component at time t.
The trend component refers to broad movements extending over a con-
siderable time period while the residual component is the irregular,
fluctuating series remaining after the trend component has been removed.
When trend has been appropriately identified and removed from a time
series, the remaining residuals should be stationary. A time series
is stationary if there is no systematic change in mean (no trend) , if
there is no systematic change in variance, and if strictly periodic
54
variations have been removed. In other words, the residual compo-
nent is stationary if the expected value of the residuals is a constant
and if the covariance between any two observations only depends on the
i
55
time lag.
In this section we attempt to identify the estimate the trend com-
ponent in each BPR index so that it can be removed and analyzed. Sub-
sequently, we consider alternative probability models that explain the
behavior of the stationary residual component.
54
Christopher Chatfield, The Analysis of Time Series; Theory and
Practice (London: Chapman and Hall, 1975), p. 14.
This is the definition for weak stationarity rather than strict
stationarity. Strict stationarity requires that the joint distribu-
tion is the same for all time points. The term stationary, as used
in this study will always refer to weak stationarity.
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One can estimate trends in the BPR indices from two viewpoints.
Either a regression model of causal variables for most of the six year
period or a pure linear trend for a segment of the six year period.
Estimation of the Trend Component by a
Causal Variable Model
The correlograms in Figures 3 and 4 suggested that the BPR indices
are partly composed of a non-linear trend . Therefore, an approach
that estimates the trend for the entire six year time span must be
capable of identifying a non-linear trend.
One approach for estimating the non-linear trend component is a
regression of the BPR indices on lagged causal variables with two
characteristics. First, there should be an underlying, theoretical
reason why the causal variable may be related to the BPR index. Second,
the causal variables should have trend fluctuations similar (either in
a positive or negative direction) to the BPR indices. The second
criteria suggests that a variable may be related to the indices, but
the variable is useless in a trend fitting model if it has a constant
trend.
Variables Affecting Block Dealer Costs
Rejection of the initial null hypothesis suggests that the syste-
matic behavior of block, dealer costs may be explained by other
variables. Inventory theory indicates how dealers price their ser-
vices. Hence, the study of dealer costs over time involves the analy-
sis of variables which affect the marginal costs of holding inventory.
The following factors are postulated to affect both BPR and BPR the° r p n
same way.
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Daily Market Volatility . One would expect the BPR indices to be posi-
tively related to daily market volatility (MV) because a major risk of
holding security inventories is the risk of unanticipated changes in
capital value due to changing security prices. The operational defi-
nition for market volatility is:
|P (t) - P (t)|
MV(t) J
ph(t)+Pi(t)
'
where,
MV(t) = market volatility for time t;
P, (t) = dailv high of the Standard and Poors
h
composite index for time t;
P..(t) = daily low of the Standard and Poors
composite index for time t;
Data for the Standard and Poor's composite index were
collected from the Stock Price Record.
Daily Level of Trading Activity . The BPR indices are expected to be
negatively related to trading activity because the dealer' s inventory
holding cost is a function of the holding period and heavy trading
reduces the holding period. Several measures of trading activity are
considered including the reported share volume on the NYSE(V ).
Because the main source of supply and demand is other institutions,
Standard and Poor's Corporation, ISL Daily Stock Price Record—New
York Stock Exchange (issues for January 1972-December 1977).
Included in the Stock Price Record, Ibid.
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several measures concentrate on block trading activity: (1) block
share volume on the NYSE (V, ); (2) daily number of plus tick blocks
(B ); (3) the daily number of negative tick blocks (B ); (4) the
P n
daily number of total blocks (B ); and (5) the ratio of block share
w
CO
volume to reported share volume (V /V )
.
Daily Average Block Size . One would expect the BPR indices to be
positively related to average block size (A) because with larger
blocks dealers would have to position more securities which would
increase their marginal inventory holding costs. Average block size
is computed as:
vAt)
A(t)
=¥To
w
where,
A(t) = average block size for time t;
V,(t) = block share volume during time t;
B (t) = number of blocks traded during time t.
w
The following factors would probably not affect the two indices
the same.
Proportion of Positive or Negative Tick Blocks . The BPR index is
positively related to the proportion of positive tick blocks traded
(B /B ). The BPR index is Dositively related to the proportion of
p w n - *- *—-
negative tick blocks traded (B /B ). When anxious traders primarily
n w
tend to be on one side of the market, the dealer's inventory quickly
5 8
Source: NYSE Large Blocks and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc.
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deviates from his desired inventory levels and he will bid more aggres-
sively on the passive side to bring his inventory levels in balance.
Although all of these variables are related to the BPR indices in
terms of inventory theory, it is necessary to examine the time series
plots of these variables to determine if the plots are consistent with
the hypothesized relationship.
The market volatility plot seems consistent with the expected
positive relationship so this variable (MV) is used. We hypothesized
a negative relationship between the BPR indices and trading activity
which is consistent with the plots. Still, because the several acti-
vity variables are similar, we used block share volume (V, ) as a broad
b
block activity variable. The time series plot of the average block
size was relatively flat so this variable was not used. The plot of
B /B exhibits trend movements similar to BPR so is included in its
n w n
model. In contrast, the plot of B /B appeared to have a negative
p w
relationship with BPR but was still included.
P
In sum, the following causal variable trend models are suggested
by the theoretical relationships and the time plots:
BPR (t) = b + b
n
MV (t-1) + b. Vv (t-1) + b, B /B (t-1) + e(t)
p ol z b Jpw
and,
BPR (t) = b + b. MV (t-1) + b„ V, (t-1) + b- B /B (t-1) + e(t)
n ol zb jnw
where,
BPR (t) = positive tick block price reaction;
BPR (t) = negative tick block price reaction;
MV (t-1) = market volatility lagged one day;
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V, (t-1) = block share volume lagged one day;
b
B /B (t-1) = ratio of the number of positive tick blocks to
p w
total blocks, lagged one day;
B /B (t-1) = ratio of the number of negative tick blocks to
n w
total blocks, lagged one day;
e(t) = residual of the causal variable regression.
An additional method of trend determination is to split the time
series into two segments and fit a separate trend component to each
segment. A natural date for the time series split is May 1, 1975,
when the security commission fee became fully negotiable. Because
negotiated commission fees had a tremendous impact upon the exchanges
and the security industry, a change in the basic trend process can be
reasonably assumed to have occurred on May 1, 1975. Rather than esti-
mating the above models with the complete 1972-1977 data set, the
models are estimated for two separate time periods covering April 1972-
April 1975 and May 1975-Deceraber 1977. The first three months of 1972
are not included, because data on the number of positive and negative
tick blocks are not available.
The results of the causal trend fitting regressions in Table 4
suggests that the variables provide useful estimates for at least a
portion of the trend component. However, the t-ratios and related
statistics should be cautiously interpreted because successive obser-
vations are dependent in many of the time series. Therefore, the
number of observations is not necessarily going to "improve" the sta-
tistics and an exact test of significance is not possible.
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The estimated coefficients of the four regression models may be
used to estimate and plot the BPR trends. For example, Figures 5 and
6 illustrate how the BPR trends estimated by the regression models
compare to the actual levels of the BPR indices. It appears that the
regression models have successively captured the majority of the trend
movement in the BPR indices.
The mean of each of the residual series generated by the causal
variable regression is, by definition, equal to zero. Nevertheless,
any remaining linear trend must be removed to produce stationary resi-
dual series. The slopes of the linear trends remaining in the resi-
dual series are listed in Table 5. Time series plots of the BPR resi-
P
duals after linear trend removal indicate that much of the trend has
been removed relative to the indices original time plots in Figures 1
and 2 and they appear to be relatively flat with the exception of the
BPR index during 1973 and 1974.
n
Estimation of the residual series' autocorrelations also provides
an indication of whether the trend has been successfully identified
and removed. Table 6 lists the estimated autocorrelation coefficients
for each residual series. The table demonstrates that much of the
trend has been removed, because the autocorrelation coefficients are
substantially below the autocorrelation coefficients of the original
BPR indices. The important question is whether enough of the trend
has been removed so that the remaining residual terms are relatively
stationary.
The autocorrelation coefficients may be compared to their asso-
ciated confidence limits to determine whether the time series is
2.50 T
2.00
1.50
5 1.00
0.50
-51-
Actual
Predicted
1972 1973 1974 1975
YEAR
1976 1977
Fig;. 5 Monthly causal variable model predicted BPR trend versus actual monthly BPR trend
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Fig. 6 Monthly causal variable model predicted BPR trend versus actual monthly BPR trend
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TABLE 5
LINEAR TREND REMOVED FROM THE RESIDUALS OF
THE CAUSAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS
April 1972-April 1975 May 1975-December 1977
Linear Trend
Components BPR
D
BPR
n
BPR
P
BPR
n
Mean
Slope
0.0
.000251
0.0
.000115
0.0
-.000052
0.0
-.000100
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TABLE 6
AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE BLOCK PRICE REACTION
RESIDUAL COMPONENTS: CAUSAL VARIABLE MODELS
April 1972 -April 1975 May 1975-•December 1977
Lag BPR
P
BPR
n
BPR
P
BPR
n
1 0.126** 0.202** 0.011 0.097**
2 -.043 .087* -.055 .026
3 .016 .064 .060 .093**
4 .149** .138** .014 -.017
5 .057 .120** .083* .086**
5 -.004 .130** -.040 .105**
7 -.018 .188** -.005 .108**
3 -.016 .084* .057 .049
9 .058 .093** -.003 .032
10 .067 .095** .030 .021
11 -.063 .093** -.010 .005
12 .005 .134** .051 -.001
13 .060 .090* .022 .040
14 .109** .029 .055 .028
15 0.021 0.085* 0.001 0.076
NOTE: The block price reaction residual components were generated by
removing a linear trend from the causal variable model regression residuals
Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
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stationary. The autocorrelation coefficients of a weak white noise
time series are asymptotically normally distributed under weak, condi-
tions where the mean is approximately -1/T, the variance is approxi-
59
mately 1/T, and T is the total size of the time series. This
distribution theory can be used to construct confidence limits for the
estimated autocorrelation coefficients. Recall that a stationary time
series is characterized by autocorrelation coefficients that approach
zero at reasonably short lags so their autocorrelation coefficients
should lie between the confidence limits after a reasonably short lag.
The results in Table 6 suggests that the time series are all sta-
tionary except the BPR residuals for April 1972-April 1975 because a
substantial number of the coefficients are significant for this
series.
Pure Linear Trend Models for July 1976-December 1977
A pure linear trend component model is defined as a series that
has a linear trend component. Rather than estimating a non-linear
trend for the entire BPR series, the series can be examined to deter-
mine whether a segment of the time series is approximately linear.
This approach is advantageous since it does not introduce any other
variables to explain trend. Instead, the method relies on the variable
itself to determine the trend component. Visual inspection of the BPR
time plots in Figures 1 and 2 indicates that both indices have rela-
tively flat trends for the period mid-1976 through 1977. Even the
causal regression models predicted flat trends for this time segment.
59
Chatfield, The Analysis of Time Series: Theory and Practice, p. 62-63,
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TABLE 7
AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE BLOCK PRICE REACTION
RESIDUAL COMPONENTS: JULY 1976-DECEMBER 1977 PURE LINEAR TREND MODELS
Lag BPR
D
BPR„
n
1 0.113* 0.139**
2 .011 .on
3 .065 .101*
4 -.044 -.030
5 .093 .082
6 .035 .162**
7 -.035 .108*
8 -.066 .035
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
.049
.070
.032
.051
.090
.047
0.020
.055
.116*
.004
.022
-.010
-.014
0.004
NOTE: The block price residual components were generated by removing a
linear trend from the original time series.
""Significant at the .05 level.
Significant at the .01 level.
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The BPR indices for July 1976-December 1977 were examined to
determine whether removal of pure linear trends left stationary resi-
dual series. An analysis of the plots suggest that both series are
stationary after linear trend removal and the assumption of station-
arity is further supported by the autocorrelation estimates listed in
Table 7 which approach zero over relatively short time lags.
In sum, both BPR indices have non-linear trend components over
the entire six year time span. Much of the non-linear trend may be
explained by a combination of a causal variable regression, a split of
the data set as of May 1, 1975, and a linear slope remaining in the
residual terms. The resulting residual series were all stationary
except for BPR during the time period April 72-April 75. Finally, a
pure linear trend component was estimated for both indices during July
1976-December 1977 and both of the residual series were stationary after
removal of trend.
TIME DOMAIN MODELS FOR THE RESIDUAL
COMPONENT OF THE BPR INDICES
Once the trend components are removed from the original BPR indices,
the remaining residual components are stationary in mean and variance.
From an economic standpoint, an important question is whether the sta-
tionary residual is white noise. Although prior tests indicated that
the original BPR indices are not white noise, the question remains of
whether the residual component of the BPR indices is white noise . If
the residual component is white noise this implies that successive
values are uncorrelated and prediction of future BPR values can be made
by simple forecasts of only the trend component. Alternatively, if
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the residual component is not white noise this suggests that past
observations of the residual process provides useful information and
prediction of the BPR index is enhanced by both a model of the trend
component and a probability model of how the residual components
behaves over time .
This section examines the BPR residual components by first deter-
mining whether the residual series are white noise and then examining
the non-white noise residual series to build appropriate time series
models.
White Noise Tests
To determine whether the residual series are white noise two simi-
lar approaches are used which depend on the estimated autocorrelation
coefficients. The first white noise test examines whether the indivi-
dual autocorrelation coefficients are statistically different from zero
assuming the distribution of autocorrelation coefficients for a white
noise process. Under a 95 percent confidence limit, one "significant"
autocorrelation coefficient out of twenty is expected under the assump-
tion of white noise. If the series is not white noise, there may be
several significant autocorrelation coefficients over the first twenty
time lags.
The second test of white noise is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
which considers the goodness of fit between the hypothesized distribu-
tion function for white noise and the empirical distribution function
for a set of autocorrelation coefficients. The hypothesis of white
60
,Robert V. Hogg and Elliot A. Tanis, Probability and Statistical
Inference (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1977), p. 281-83.
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noise is rejected if the empirical distribution function is suf-
ficiently different from the white noise distribution function. While
the first test checks each individual autocorrelation coefficient, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test examines several autocorrelation coefficients
at the same time.
The five following stationary residual series were tested for
white noise behavior: BPR for April 1972-April 1975; BPR and BPR
P P n
for May 1975-December 1977; and BPR and BPR for July 1976-December
p n
1977. The first three series were derived from the causal model and
the last two series resulted from the pure linear trend models.
The autocorrelation coefficients for the five series are given in
Tables 6 and 7. The BPR residual series for May 1975-December 1977
n
are clearly not white noise, because they each have 5 out of 15 signi-
ficant coefficients based upon 95 percent confidence limits. In
contrast, the BPR residuals for the same two time periods are pre-
sumably white noise, since they have only 1 out of 15 significant
coefficients. A clear interpretation for the BPR residuals of April
P
1972-April 1975 is difficult, because there were only 3 significant
coefficients out of the 15 examined. In this case, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test can provide additional insight.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results in Table 8 are based upon the
autocovariances at all lags up through lag seven. The statistic is
compared to critical points calculated for both 5 percent and 1 percent
significance levels. The results indicate that all BPR residuals are
white noise, but all the BPR residuals are not white noise.
1 n
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TABLE 8
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV STATISTICS FOR TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS OF
WHITE NOISE BASED ON THE BLOCK PRICE REACTION RESIDUAL COMPONENTS
Decision Based Decision Based
on a Five Percent Or. a On« Percent
Residual Kolmogrov-Smirnov Critical Point Critical Point
Component Test Statistics Equal to .481 Equal to .576
BPR
p
0.383 Accept Accept
(April 72-
April 75)
BPR
p
.225 Accept Accept
(May 75-
Dec. 77)
BPR
n
.675 Reject Reject
(May 75-
Dec. 77)
BPR
P
(July 76-
.337 Accept Accept
Dec. 77)
BPR
n
0.534 Reject Reject
(July 76-
Dec. 77)
NOTE: The test statistics were calculated based upon autocovariances
at all lags up through lag seven.
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In sum, a prediction of the BPR index should be based entirely
! e p £
on a simple estimate of its future trend component . In contrast, a_
prediction of the BPR index should be based on both the trend compo-
— n s—
nent and a time series model of the residual component.
Autoregressive Models of the BPR_ Residual Component
Because the residual components of the BPR index are not weak
white noise, this subsection focuses on fitting a suitable model to
the residual series. It is assumed that a given value of the
BPR residual series depends on its immediate past values combined
n
with a random error. This implies that factors which influence block
dealer cost decisions may have a systematic dependence on past history
and the price impact of new information may produce a "disturbance
term" or random error on any given day. A time domain model that is
consistent with this physical interpretation of the BPR residual com-
ponent is the following autoregressive process
P
e(t) = I a e (t-s) + Z (t)
where,
s=l
S
e(t) = a stationary residual time series;
z(t) = a weak white noise time series;
a = the autoregressive coefficient at time lag s;
6
1
p = the order of the autoregressive process.
A finite order autoregressive process is assumed to adequately
approximate the underlying stochastic process primarily because of the
economic situation. In addition, this assumption may be supported by
the duality between the autoregressive and moving average processes.
Durbin pointed out that a high order autoregressive process may be
fitted to a moving average process with only a small error. See
Maurice Kendall, Time Series (New York: Hafner Press, 1976), p. 161.
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Fitting an autoregressive scheme to the BPR residual series
n
involves two related questions: (a) what is the order of the process
and (b) what are the estimated autoregressive coefficients of the pro-
cess.
To determine the order of an autoregressive process one fits pro-
cesses of progressively higher order to the residual series and calcu-
lates Quenouille chi-square statistics at each order. ' The statistics
establish whether the given order of p is large enough so that higher
orders do not significantly improve the fit. If a given order is not
high enough, then the statistic at the next highest order is checked.
This procedure is continued until a particular autoregressive order
can be accepted according to the Quenouille chi-square statistic. The
autoregressive coefficients for any given order are calculated by a
recursive solution to the Yule-Walker equations.
Table 9 lists the Quenouille test statistics for the BPR residual
n
components covering both the May 1975-December 1977 and the July 1976-
December 1977 time periods. The null hypothesis for a given order p is
tested against the alternative hypothesis which states that the order
is from (p+2) to (p+5). The results of the test statistics indicate
64
that the autoregressive order of both residual series is 6.
62
M. H. Quenouille, Approximate Tests of Correlation in Time Series,
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , Bll-68 (1949).
ft 1
Chatfield, The Analysis of Time Series: Theory and Practice
,
p. 68.
64
A visual inspection of the residual variances plotted against order
also supports the acceptance for an order of 6.
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TABLE 9
QUENOULLI CHI-SQUARE TEST STATISTICS FOR THE RESIDUAL COMPONENT
OF THE NEGATIVE TICK BLOCK PRICE REACTION INDICES
esized
gression
(P)
BPR (May 75-
n
Dec. 77) BPR (July 75-
n
Dec. 77)
Hypoth
Autore
Order
Test Statistics
for Alternative
Orders (p+2)
through (p+5)
Decision at
the Five
Percent
Significance
Level
Test Statistics
for Alternative
Orders (p+2)
through (p+5)
Decision at
the Five
Percent
Significance
Level
1 15.702 Reject 13.428 Reject
2 18.423 Reject 15.234 Reject
3 12.074 Reject 15.196 Reject
4 17.927 Reject 15.704 Reject
5 11.239 Reject 10.917 Reject
6 4.939 Accept 6.931 Accept
Each statistic is tested against a chi-square distribution with four
degress of freedom.
-63-
The autoregressive models of the two BPR residual components may
be expressed as
A) BPR residual component for May 1975-December 1977
n
e(t) = .0938 e(t-l) + .0037 e(t-2) + .0856 (t-3) - .0449 e(t-4) +
.0825 e(t-5) + .0825 (t-6) + z(t),
B) BPR residual component for July 1976-December 1977
e(t) = .1395 e(t-l) - .0185 e(t-2) + .0968 (t-3) - .0709 e(t-4) +
.0791 e(t-5) + .1297 (t-6) + z(t).
Forecasting
Forecasting future block dealer costs is a particularly impor-
tant problem for institutional block, traders. The BPR index can ber n
forecasted by combining a projection of the trend component and the
residual component. A forecast of BPR for s steps into the future
may be expressed as
BPR (t+s) = m (t+s) + e (t+s)
n
where,
BPR (t+s) = the block price reaction on negative tick blocks
for day (t+s) forecasted on day t;
m (t+s) = the projection of the trend component for day (t+s)
forecasted on day t;
e (t+s) = the projection of the residual component for day
(t+s) forecasted on day t;
s = lead time.
Either the causal regression trend model or the pure linear trend
model project future values for the trend component. The residual
-64-
component is predicted by the estimated autoregressive models. In
general, the linear least square predictor for an autoregressive pro-
cess of order p is
s-1 n p
e (t+s) = Z &, e (t+s-k) + Z a, e (t+s-k).
k=l
k
k=s
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation substitutes pre-
dictors for the unknown future residual values, while, the second term
uses the known residual values. The equation provides the best point
estimate of the future residual value. In addition, the coefficients
can be used to calculate a prediction variance for each forecasted
residual value.
Table 10 provides forecasting example for the BPR index by
applying the trend component and residual component models from the
July 1976-Deceraber 1977 time period. Given the data available on the
last day of 1977, forecasts are made for the first 10 days in 1978.
The trend component is estimated by extrapolating the negatively sloped
linear trend derived earlier. The forecast for the residual component
is the linear least square estimator for the given autoregressive pro-
cess. Prediction intervals are constructed by first summing the trend
components and residual components to get point predictions and pre-
diction variances are used to calculate 50 percent and 95 percent pre-
diction limits. Notably, when the prediction intervals are compared
to the actual 1978 observations, 6 out of 10 fall in the 50 percent
prediction interval and 10 out of 10 fall in the 95 percent prediction
interval.
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In summary, this section demonstrated that residual component of
the BPR index is weak white noise which suggests that forecasts of
the BPR index should be based entirely on a projection of the trend
p
component. In contrast, the white noise hypothesis was rejected for
the residual component of the BPR index which means a model of the
n
residual component for the BPR index is beneficial. An autoregres-
sive process of order 6 was found to fit the BPR residual components
for both May 1975-Deceraber 1977 and July 1976-Deceraber 1977. Given
the trend models and the autoregressive models, prediction intervals
were constructed for the BPR index.
n
FREQUENCY DOMAIN MODELS FOR THE RESIDUAL
COMPONENTS OF THE BPR INDICES
A growing body of experience indicates that the analysis of time
series is aided by a consideration of both time properties and the
6 S
frequency properties of the data. The prior section discussed the
autocorrelation function which considers the evolution of the BPR
residuals through time. In this section, the spectral density func-
tion is introduced to examine the frequency properties of the BPR
residuals. In essence, spectral analysis describes how variation
in a time series may be accounted for by cyclical components at dif-
ferent frequencies.
See Clive W. J. Granger and M. Hatanaka, Spectral Analysis of Eco-
nomic Time Series (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1964) or Gwilym M. Jenkins and Donald G. Watts, Spectral Analysis and
Its Applications (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1968).
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Theoretically, either the spectral density function or the auto-
covariance function can be deduced from one another. However, addi-
tional information is gained by computing both functions, because
each form presents its own interpretation of the data.
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An essential element of spectral analysis is frequency which is
defined as the number of cycles (periods) per unit of time. For
example, if a time series has a frequency of .2 cycles per day, then
it takes 5 days to complete one full cycle. However, the variation
of most economic time series cannot be represented by a strict periodic
function, because the amplitude and phase of economic cycles change
irregularly over time. Yet, many economic time series have regular
fluctuations since the average length of the series' oscillations
remain constant. Fortunately, the spectral method provides a mathe-
matically natural approach to this mixture of regularity and non-regu-
larity. The method allows a broader interpretation of cycles since
fluctuations do not have to be perfectly regular. The method can
reflect any tendency in the residual series for periodic variations to
occur in particular frequency ranges . In other words, cycles with
nearly all the same length periods may be associated with a single
range of frequencies (sometimes referred to as a frequency band ).
Several studies have applied the spectral technique to the analy-
sis of stock market prices. The research focused on the estimated
spectrums of stock market price series. Estimated spectrums are
graphical representations of the estimated spectral density function
against frequency as abscissa.
67
See Clive W. J. Granger and Oskar Morgenstern, Predictability of
Stock Market Prices (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington Books,
1970); For recent applications, see Jimmy E. Hilliard, "The Relation-
ship Between Equity Indices on World Exchanges," Journal of Finance
34 (March 1979): 103-115 and Peter D. Praetz, "Testing for a Flat
Spectrum on Efficient Market Price Data," Journal of Finance 34 (June
the 1979): 645-58.
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This study is concerned with the possibility of a systematic pat-
tern in block dealer costs. Prior results indicated that the BPR
P
residuals were random, but that the BPR residuals could be modeled as
n
an autoregressive process. In this section we analyze both BPR resi-
dual series to search for any significant cyclical behavior in the
data. While the absence of cycles indicates random behavior, signi-
ficant cycles in a BPR index would demonstrate a systematic, non-random
pattern where the future dealer cost is related to the past costs.
The estimated spectrums of the BPR residuals and the BPR resi-
P n
duals are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. Data for the period July
1976-Deceraber 1977 were used for calculating both spectrums. The
spectrums were constructed by first deriving the periodograms by a
fast Fourier transform, and then smoothing the periodogram by a
Daniell window. The Daniell approach smooths the periodogram by
simply grouping the periodogram ordinates in sets of size m and then
finding their average value. An m of size 31 was used in both Figures
7 and 8.
69
The most important feature of the estimated spectrum is whether
there are any peaks. The band of frequencies associated with the peak
indicates a substantial cycle in the data. Interpretation of the
spectrum assumes the total area under the curve is equal to the
CO
Chatfield, The Analysis of Time Series: Theory and Practice
,
p. 143.
69
Several spectrums were calculated at alternative m-windows. An m=31
appeared to illustrate the major cycles important to this analysis.
70
The frequencies of the spectrum range from zero to it . it corresponds
with a half cycle per time unit, therefore, the abscissa values range
from zero to .50 cycles per day.
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Fig. 8 Estimated spectrum for the negative tick block price reaction index (m=31)
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variance of the time series. Therefore, a peak in the spectrum indi-
cates an important contribution to the total variance at the frequen-
cies in the appropriate region. In contrast, a horizontally flat
spectrum suggests that all frequencies contribute equally to the total
variance, and there are no significant cycles (e.g., a white noise
time series produces a flat spectrum).
Peaks in the spectrum may be tested for significance against a
null hypothesis which states the underlying time series is white noise
—
i.e., the true spectral density function is equal to what would be
expected under white noise. The alternative hypothesis states that the
true spectral density has a peak which is greater than the flat white
noise spectral density function. That is,
H : f(8.) = f (6)
o 10
H.: f(8 ) > f (9)
1 i o
where,
f(6.) = the true spectral density function at frequency 9.;
f (9) = the constant spectral density function assuming
white noise behavior.
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance level if
where,
In f (9.) > In fA (9) + 1.645/ mmi (J
In f (9.) = the natural logrithm of the m-windowed spectral
m l
estimator at frequency 9.;
In f
n
(9) = the natural logrithm of the constant spectral den-
sity function assuming white noise behavior. This
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is calculated by dividing the variance of the pro-
cess by the value of tt ;
m = the number of periodogram coefficients averaged,
which is the size of the Daniell window.
The estimated spectrum for the BPR residuals in Figure 7 illu-
strates several features. First, the importance of the low frequencies
suggests that the series contains long trend fluctuations, although the
length of the data is insufficient to attempt to describe these fluctua-
tions more accurately. Apparently there are two peaks at frequencies
of .190 and .345 cycles per day. Since the variance of the series is
equal to .01053 and m=31, the peaks are significant at the 5 percent
level if the natural logs of their respective spectral estimates are
greater than -5.403. The natural logs of the spectral estimators are
-5.455 at frequency .190 and -5.455 at frequency .345 (where frequency
is measured in cycles per day). Neither peak is significant, there-
fore, the BPR residuals do not have anv important cvcles. These
p
= E 1
results reaffirm the prior findings that the BPR residuals are white
noise.
The estimated spectrum for BPR residuals in Figure 8 has some
trend illustrated by the low frequency spectrum. In contrast, the two
peaks of the BPR residuals at frequencies .155 and .335 appear to be
more pronounced. The variance of the BPR residuals of .01343 produces
a test statistic of -5.160 and -5.225 at the 5 percent and 10 percent
significance levels. The natural logs of the spectral estimates are
-5.132 at frequency .155 and -5.192 at frequency .335. Notably, the
peak at frequency .155 is significant at the 5 percent level indicating
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a substantial cycle of approximately 6 days in length . The 3 day
cycle represents the first harmonic of the 6 day cycle which suggests
that the important cyclical movement is the 6 day cycle.
In sum, the spectral analysis of the BPR indices indicates the
following findings. First, both series have some low frequency move-
ment remaining. Second, the BPR residual series does not have any
cyclical behavior , hence, the series has no systematic dependence on
past values. In contrast, the BPR residual series has a significant
6 day cycle with a first harmonic 3 day cycle .
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
The primary task of this study was to describe and explain the
intertemporal behavior of block dealer costs. The analysis initially
determined whether expected block dealer costs behave in a systematic
manner over time. Second, the analysis tested several exogenous market
factors which could influence the intertemporal behavior of the block
dealer costs. Such an analysis is important because it is the first
study to add the dimension of time to the existing dealer behavior
theory. In addition, this study contributes additional information
on the block securities market which has become extremely important
because of its rapid growth whereby it is a major component of our
secondary securities market. Further, the study results should assist
investment managers who recognize the need to integrate a temporal
Harmonics, which are multiples of the fundamental frequency, simply
indicate the non-sinusoidal character of the main cyclical component.
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dealer cost component into their institutional trading policy.
Finally, this study should help in the development of a model of the
block trading mechanism which can be used for monitoring security
market transaction efficiency over time.
The first section discussed the need for dealer services in an
imperfect transaction market and considered how dealers are compen-
sated. A discussion of prior studies demonstrated that cross-sec-
tional dealer costs were a function of security factors (i.e., volume
of trading and risk), market factors (i.e., the marketplace and dealer
competition), and transaction order factors (i.e., the size of the
trade and the active side of the trade). In contrast to these pre-
ceding studies, this investigation added the dimension of time by
examining the time series behavior of dealer costs. If dealer costs
behave systematically over time, one could use past information to
explain and predict future dealer costs.
This study focused on the behavior of block dealers after a dis-
cussion of the rapidly growing block transactions market which differs
from the non-block market. Since the block dealer cost is unobser-
vable this study utilized the block price reaction (BPR) indices as
the operational measures of the block dealer costs. The BPR indices
were constructed from the average absolute values of daily percentage
price changes on purchase and sale block transactions.
The extensive time series analysis of the BPR series attempted to
determine if the series were similar to a white noise process. If
they were not, then the intent was to identify the regular, systematic
pattern and possibly explain it in terms of some other market series
suggested by dealer cost theory.
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Conclusions
On the basis of the empirical tests, the following conclusions
regarding the BPR indices are in order:
BPR Index
n
1. The block dealer cost for negative tick blocks clearly behaves
in a systematic pattern over time. The runs test and the correllogram
both indicate substantial non-random behavior— i.e., the BPR series
n
is not weak white noise.
2. The behavior of the BPR index can be broken down into a trend
n
component and a residual component. Much of the trend movement can be
explained by the following lagged causal variables: market volatility,
block share volume, and the ratio of negative tick blocks to total
blocks.
3. The stationary residual component can be estimated in two
alternative ways. One method is to derive the residuals from the
causal variable regression and then remove a linear trend. Another
method removes the pure linear trend from a segment of the time series
that is relatively flat.
4. The behavior of the BPR residual component is not weak white
noise, consequently, probability models can be constructed based upon
the systematic behavior of the residuals. A time domain analysis
indicates that the BPR residual component may be modeled as an
autoregressive scheme of order 6. A spectral analysis demonstrates
that the residual series contains a major six day cycle.
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5. The BPR index can be forecasted by combining a projection of
the trend component (using either the causal variable model or pure
linear trend model) with a prediction of the residual component (using
either the autoregressive model or the six day cyclical movement).
BPR Index
P
1. Dealer costs for positive tick blocks produce a very weak
systematic pattern over time. Although the BPR index exhibits some
P
gradual trend movements, the fluctuations are weak compared to the
BPR index. The runs test supports the notion of randomness, but the
correlogram indicated some trend movement. Hence, the alternative
hypothesis is accepted if one considers the entire six-year time span.
2. The small trend movement can primarily be explained by lagged
values of market volatility, block share volume, and the ratio of the
number of positive tick blocks to the total number of blocks.
3. The residual component of BPR is weak white noise with no
P
significant cyclical fluctuations.
4. Forecasts of BPR should be based entirely on the trend compo-
nent, because of the white noise residual component behavior.
Implications
The results of this study has implications for institutional
traders, government agencies, and future research.
Institutional Traders
Institutional traders should consider the timing of the block
transaction as an additional determinant of the large, unpredictable
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dealer cost. The institutional investment manager must weigh the
anticipated transaction cost against the anticipated advantage of any
trade. Therefore, better transaction cost forecasts will improve the
investment managers decision making.
The timing dimension is most important for the institutional
trader who wants to sell a block. His dealer cost estimate must be
based upon security factors, market factors, transaction factors, and
temporal factors . Specifically, he should estimate both the trend
component and the residual component of the price impact. An examina-
tion of recent market volatility, block share volume, and the propor-
tion of negative tick blocks provides a well-founded trend estimate.
Then, the institutional block trader can predict the residual compo-
nent by using the last six observations of the BPR index in combination
with either the suggested autoregressive model or an amplitude estima-
tion model of the 6-day cycle. Furthermore, a prediction interval can
be constructed to focus the necessary information needed for his trading
decision.
The institutional block trader should not be concerned with day-
to-day block volume changes. Rather, a long-term trend estimate of
trading activity is sufficient.
In summary, the findings of this study suggest a manager can
reduce his transaction costs by monitoring the variation in dealer
costs and by remaining flexible regarding the timing of a block trade
if possible.
In addition, investment managers must judge the transaction costs
incurred after a block trade. Specifically, institutions currently
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rate their broker-dealer on block transactions occurring in different
time periods. The results of this study indicate that when conducting
such an analysis, the intertemporal behavior of the block dealer costs
should be considered.
Governmental Agencies
Market observors charged with guiding changes in the securities
industry should contemplate the time dimension when they gauge security
dealer costs because the results of this study indicate that the
expected dealer costs change over time. As the National Market System
evolves, the SEC should observe the intertemporal variation of block
dealer costs to determine the effects of their policy changes.
Future Research
Cross-sectional studies on dealer costs must be particularly care-
ful in matching the data according to time. Studies which compare
dealer costs on transactions occurring in distinctly different time
periods may distort their findings.
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